Bernice Consalvo v. Dial-A-Gift, Inc., a Utah Corporation, Clarence L. Jolley, and Mary Lou Jolley, Does 1-20 : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1993
Bernice Consalvo v. Dial-A-Gift, Inc., a Utah
Corporation, Clarence L. Jolley, and Mary Lou
Jolley, Does 1-20 : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Brian W. Steffensen; Attorney for Appellant.
Ronald C. Barker; David C. Cundick; Attorney for Appellees.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Consalvo v. Dial A Gift Inc, No. 930225 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1993).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/5107
cr 
UTAH 
K F U 
%o WOW? 
DOCKET NO. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BERNICE CONSALVO, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
DIAL-A-GIFT, INC., a Utah 
Corporation, CLARENCE L. 
JOLLEY, and MARY LOU JOLLEY, 
DOES 1-20, 
Defendants and Appellees 
Case No. 930225-CA 
Priority No. 15 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
On Appeal from the Judgment of 
the Third Judicial District Court 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson 
Brian W. Steffensen, #3092 
Huntsman Building 
3760 S. Highland Dr., Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Telephone: (801) 273-3962 
Attorney for Appellant, 
Bernice Consalvo 
Ronald C. Barker, #0208 
David C. Cundick, #4817 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84115-3692 
Attorney for Appellees, 
Dial-A-Gift, Clarence L, 
and Mary Lou Jolley 
Jolley, 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
MAY 2 5 1993 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BERNICE CONSALVO, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
DIAL-A-GIFT, INC., a Utah 
Corporation, CLARENCE L. 
JOLLEY, and MARY LOU JOLLEY, 
DOES 1-20, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Case No. 930225-CA 
Priority No. 15 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
On Appeal from the Judgment of 
the Third Judicial District Court 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson 
Brian W. Steffensen, #3092 
Huntsman Building 
3760 S. Highland Dr., Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Telephone: (801) 273-3962 
Attorney for Appellant, 
Bernice Consalvo 
Ronald C. Barker, #0208 
David C. Cundick, #4817 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84115-3692 
Attorney for Appellees, 
Dial-A-Gift, Clarence L. Jolley, 
and Mary Lou Jolley 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ARGUMENTS ADDRESSED IN THIS REPLY BRIEF 1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 1 
ARGUMENT 4 
POINT 1 4 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN SETTING ASIDE 
THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO URCP 60(b)(7). 
a. The attorney misconduct evident in this case does 
not reach the standard of "extraordinary" 
negligence, and defendants are subject to the 
general rule that attorney negligence is imputed to 
the client. 
POINT II 5 
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY IGNORING PLAINTIFF'S 
UNREFUTED PROFFER OF EVIDENCE OF IRREPARABLE INJURY. 
POINT III 10 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY IGNORING THEN 
DEEMED ADMITTED ADMISSIONS AS TO DAMAGE AMOUNTS WHEN IT 
REQURIED AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON THE DAMAGES. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 11 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Cruz v. Montoya, 660 P.2d 723 (Utah 1983) 4 
Jennings v. Stoker, 652 P.2d 912 (Utah 1982) 4 
Court Rules 
Utah R. Civ. Pro. 36 5 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The following court rules are reproduced and can be found in 
the appendix to this brief. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 36 
CORRECTION 
Insert the following at Argument, Point II: 
The trial court abused its discretion by ignoring plaintiffs 
unrefuted proffer of evidence of prejudice. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BERNICE CONSALVO, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
DIAL-A-GIFT, INC., a Utah 
Corporation, CLARENCE L. 
JOLLEY, and MARY LOU JOLLEY, 
DOES 1-20, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Case No. 930225-CA 
Priority No. 15 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
On Appeal from the Judgment of 
the Third Judicial District Court 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson 
Brian W. Steffensen, #3092 
Huntsman Building 
3760 S. Highland Dr., Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Telephone: (801) 273-3962 
Attorney for Appellant, 
Bernice Consalvo 
Ronald C. Barker, #0208 
David C. Cundick, #4817 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84115-3692 
Attorney for Appellees, 
Dial-A-Gift, Clarence L. Jolley, 
and Mary Lou Jolley 
ARGUMENTS ADDRESSED IN THIS REPLY BRIEF 
Appellant/Plaintiff Bernice Consalvo will argue the following 
points in reply to the arguments raised by Appellee/Defendants 
Dial-A-Gift and the Jolleys in their Brief: 
1. The trial court abused its discretion in setting aside 
the summary judgment pursuant to URCP 60(b)(7). The attorney 
misconduct evident in this case does not reach the standard of 
"extraordinary" negligence, and defendants are subject to the 
general rule that attorney negligence is imputed to the client. 
2. The trial court abused its discretion by ignoring 
plaintiff's unrefuted proffer of evidence of prejudice. 
3. The trial court abused its discretion by ignoring then 
deemed admitted admissions as to damage amounts when it required an 
evidentiary hearing on damages. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff served upon defendants summons, complaint and 
discovery, including requests for admissions. (R. 0027) Defendants 
answered, but failed to respond to discovery. (R. 0038) Several 
months later, plaintiff made a motion for summary judgment based 
upon the deemed admitted admissions, there being no genuine issue 
of material fact remaining. (R. 0039) Defendants opposed the 
summary judgment and made a motion to withdraw the admissions. (R. 
0082) In a minute entry dated August 13, 1990 the trial court 
ruled that defendants' motion to withdraw would only be allowed if 
plaintiff were reimbursed for her attorney fees for having to bring 
a summary judgment. (R. 0147) If the fees were paid within 30 
days, plaintiff's summary judgment would be denied. (R. 0167) 
Defendants did not pay plaintiff's attorney fees, and judgment 
was entered for plaintiff, (R. 0185) Defendants' various counsel 
then filed numerous supplemental papers with the court attempting 
to circumvent the judgment, including a motion for review of the 
order providing for fees (R. 0175), an order extending time for 
appeal (R. 0199), an objection to entry of order and memorandum in 
support thereof (R. 0210), a motion to vacate orders (R. 0243), and 
others. Plaintiff expended significant sums of money vigorously 
opposing each and every new motion put before the court by 
defendants. 
Defendants hired new counsel, who entered the case and filed 
an objection to the order and voluminous memoranda in support 
thereof. (R. 0210) Plaintiff responded. Defendants' present 
counsel then entered the case and contacted plaintiff's counsel, 
requesting permission to file a reply brief. Plaintiff agreed on 
the condition that no new issues be raised in the reply, since 
plaintiff procedurally would be unable to counter. In flagrant 
violation of the agreement, defendants' present counsel raised 
several new issues. (R. 0350) Plaintiff objected to the reply, or 
second motion, and asked that it be stricken. (R. 0382) 
At a hearing held March 11, 1991 the trial court granted 
defendants' motion to vacate the prior order of summary judgment. 
(R. 0392) Plaintiff requested her attorney fees, which request was 
reserved for later decision. Defendants prepared an order at the 
request of the trial court. Plaintiff objected to the order on the 
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grounds that it did not reflect, 1) that the second motion filed by 
defendants as part of their reply was not properly before the court 
and plaintiff should be entitled to respond thereto, 2) that the 
court granted defendants second motion without giving plaintiff the 
opportunity to brief the same, and 3) that plaintiff was not given 
an opportunity to show irreparable damage and prejudice should the 
court allow the withdrawal of admissions, given the nine months of 
dereliction and delay caused by defendants. (R. 0397) 
In a minute entry dated April 5, 1991 the trial court noted 
plaintiff's objections to the proposed order, and ruled that 
plaintiff be allowed to proffer evidence of irreparable damage or 
prejudice caused should withdrawal of admissions be granted. (R. 
0410) Plaintiff therefore made a detailed proffer of such 
evidence, outlining in memoranda to the court that key witnesses 
had moved away and become unavailable, that other key witnesses had 
suffered memory diminishment due to the delay in the suit, and that 
litigation resources had become severely depleted due to the 
avalanche of motions brought by defendants that plaintiff had been 
required to oppose and incur attorney fees therefor. (R. 0427A) 
Plaintiff requested a hearing in open court to fully present 
all evidence supporting plaintiff's contention that granting 
defendants motion to withdraw admissions would substantially and 
severely prejudice the plaintiff. (R. 0499) By minute entry dated 
June 14, 1991 the trial court indicated its satisfaction with its 
earlier ruling and entered the order prepared by defendants. (R. 
0491) Plaintiff was not granted a hearing to proffer the evidence 
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of prejudice she was prepared to demonstrate. 
Plaintiff soon thereafter was buried in burdensome discovery 
requests from defendants, and having remained unreimbursed for 
defendants' numerous motions, was unable to pay counsel, who was 
forced to withdraw. (R. 0535) Plaintiff was sanctioned by 
dismissal of her action and ordered to pay defendants' attorney 
fees. (R. 0701) On appeal, the case is now before this Court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. The trial court abused its discretion in setting 
aside the summary judgment pursuant to URCP 60(b)(7). 
The attorney misconduct evident in this case does not reach 
the standard of "extraordinary" negligence, and defendants are 
subject to the general rule that attorney negligence is imputed to 
the client. Appellees agree that the general standard is that a 
civil action will not be reversed merely because privately retained 
counsel is incompetent. Cruz v. Montoya, 660 P.2d 723, 728 (Utah 
1983). Jennings v. Stoker, 652 P.2d 912 (Utah 1982), which was 
decided by our Supreme Court a year before Montoya/ states that in 
limited situations of exigent or exceptional circumstances, a new 
trial may be granted due to incompetence of trial counsel. 
Appellees seek to extend this rule beyond its intended borders. 
This case does not present a situation of exigent or 
exceptional circumstances. Defendants' counsel negligently failed 
to respond to requests for admissions pursuant to Rule 36. This 
oversight resulted in the admissions being deemed admitted. Under 
4 
defendants interpretation of Jennings, Rule 36 would never have any 
force. Rule 36 is intended to provide a speedy resolution of 
disputes by requiring a party to either admit or deny allegations. 
Deadlines exist for responding. A litigant's remedy for negligence 
by his counsel is against his counsel. 
In this case, defendants ask this Court to require plaintiff 
to bear the burden and expense of defendants' counsel's negligence. 
The result asked for by defendants is patently unjust and a 
circumvention of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court 
abused its discretion by effectively requiring plaintiff to bear 
the burden of defendants' counsel's negligence. 
POINT II. The trial court improperly denied plaintiff the 
opportunity to a hearing to prove preiudice and/or injury to 
plaintiff resulting from the withdrawal of deemed admitted 
admissions under Rule 36(b). 
Rule 36(b) states: 
Any matter admitted under this rule is conclusively 
established unless the court on motion permits withdrawal 
or amendment of the admission. Subject to the provisions 
of Rule 16 governing amendment of pretrial order, the 
court may permit withdrawal or amendment when the 
presentation of the merits of the action will be 
subserved thereby and the party who obtains the admission 
fails to satisfy the court that withdrawal or amendment 
will prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense 
on the merits. [Appendix 1] 
Any matter admitted is conclusively established. However, upon 
motion, the party against whom admissions are obtained may seek to 
withdraw those admissions. The party who has obtained admissions 
must be allowed a fair and complete opportunity to demonstrate 
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prejudice should admissions be withdrawn. 
Defendants/appellees assert in their Brief that plaintiff was 
given the opportunity to show prejudice before defendants' motion 
to withdraw and amend admissions was granted. This is only 
partially true. Plaintiff proffered to the court by memorandum 
unrefuted evidence of prejudice, but was not given the opportunity 
to put on said evidence at an appropriate hearing. Defendants 
assertion is thus unfair and misleading to this Court. 
Defendants' present counsel sought permission from plaintiff's 
counsel to file a belated reply brief in an effort to overturn the 
prior grant of summary judgment. Plaintiff's counsel gave 
permission on the condition that the reply brief not include any 
new matters or arguments, since plaintiff would not have the 
opportunity to respond. In flagrant violation of the agreement, 
defendants' reply brief raised numerous new issues. Plaintiff 
objected to the reply brief and asked that it be stricken. 
At the March 11, 1991 hearing Judge Hanson, over plaintiff's 
objection, ordered that the previously granted summary judgment be 
vacated and asked defendants to prepare an order. Plaintiff 
objected to the proposed order on the grounds that, 1) it failed to 
reflect that plaintiff did not have the opportunity to properly 
respond to defendants reply, and 2) the order did not reflect the 
fact that plaintiff had not been given the opportunity to show the 
injury and prejudice that would flow to plaintiff if not otherwise 
made whole. 
In a minute entry dated April 5, 1993 the court ruled that 
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plaintiff should be allowed to show evidence of injury or prejudice 
caused to plaintiff by allowing withdrawal of the deemed admitted 
admissions. The court stated: 
The Court has not reviewed the file to determine whether 
or not Mr. Steffensen's complaints regarding the 
inability to brief the defendant's second Motion, and the 
submission of materials to show irreparable damage is 
correct or is not correct. It does not appear that a 
review of the file on that issue will be necessary, 
inasmuch as the Court in an effort to insure that Mr. 
Steffensen is given an opportunity to address all 
relevant issues, will allow Mr. Steffensen to supplement 
the file in those two respects. (R. 0411) 
Per the ruling, plaintiff filed with the court memorandum detailing 
the prejudice resulting to plaintiff should the court allow 
withdrawal of the admissions. Plaintiff's memorandum outlined her 
readiness to proffer evidence demonstrating the financial drain on 
plaintiff's litigation resources resulting from eighteen months of 
case dereliction by defendants and the diminished ability of 
plaintiff to pursue her action because of witness unavailability 
and memory loss. Plaintiff argued: 
The Court's insistence at the August 13, 1990 hearing 
that the Motion to Withdraw not be granted unless the 
Court could be certain that the plaintiff would not 
suffer in any way as a result thereof was the very least 
that the court should have done. Nothing has changed 
since then. The Court similarly should not now grant the 
Motion to Withdraw unless the plaintiff can be and 
actually is made completely whole. The Rules, cases and 
principles of fairness and equity require an immediate 
reimbursement for all of the plaintiff's costs and 
expenses related to the numerous motions, etc., made 
since the September 11, 19 9 0 Order, An inquiry must also 
be made into whether the defendants' eighteen month delay 
in this case has so substantially prejudiced the 
plaintiff's ability to proceed to trial on the merits as 
to require an outright and unconditional denial of the 
Motion to Withdraw. (R. 0437) 
Plaintiff further argued to the trial court: 
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The defendants' Amended Motion and memoranda in support 
thereof, admit that the Motion to Withdraw cannot be 
granted if plaintiff would be substantially prejudiced in 
proceeding on the merits as a result thereof. The 
defendants then falsely assert that plaintiff can make no 
showing of substantial prejudice. 
Unfortunately, during the eighteen months of delay and 
dereliction on the part of defendants herein, many of 
plaintiff's witness have moved away and/or had their 
recollection of the facts that plaintiff would like to 
adduce at trial substantially diminish. Plaintiff 
intends to continue her vigorous attempts to relocate all 
of the key witnesses for trial. Plaintiff also hopes 
that several other witnesses experience a substantial 
degree of "memory resurrection" between not and the trial 
of this matter. But, Plaintiff's ability to present a 
strong case in her favor has obviously been substantially 
and seriously prejudiced by the eighteen month delay that 
has occurred in this case. 
Under the Rules and all the Supreme Court cases 
construing them, the Motion to Withdraw can not now be 
granted under these circumstances. Plaintiff's ability 
to proceed to trial on the merits of her claims has been 
seriously jeopardized as a direct result of the 
defendants' dereliction and delay. Plaintiff has met her 
burden of proof under Rule 3 6 of showing substantial 
prejudice. (R. 0437-0438) 
Plaintiff requested a hearing in order to fully and completely 
proffer the evidence of the prejudice that plaintiff would suffer 
under the Rule 3 6 standard should the motion to withdraw admissions 
be granted. 
In a minute entry dated June 14, 1991 the court, without 
allowing plaintiff to present evidence at the hearing she requested 
to buttress her earlier proffer of evidence of prejudice, indicated 
an unwillingness to change its order and executed the order 
proposed by defendants. Plaintiff was denied the opportunity she 
requested to submit testimony of her witnesses at a hearing on the 
issue of prejudice. To this the plaintiff assigns error. 
Early on in the case the trial court ruled that defendants 
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could only withdraw the deemed admitted admissions if plaintiff 
were not prejudiced thereby and were made whole, i.e., her 
attorneys fees paid. The trial court ruled that payment of 
plaintiff's attorney fees was a condition precedent to setting 
aside the summary judgment. Subsequently, when the same issues 
were before the court in what was effectively Round Two of the same 
fight, the only difference being that plaintiff's attorney fees 
were substantially higher and even more burdensome to her, she was 
denied both attorney fees as well as the opportunity to put on 
witness testimony to buttress her proffer of evidence of prejudice 
in open court. Appellees misstate the procedural facts of this 
case when they state that appellant was given the opportunity to 
show prejudice. 
In essence, appellant asks this court for a ruling that 
plaintiff was per se prejudiced when she was forced to incur 
substantial attorney fees in fighting voluminous motions made by 
appellees with the intent to withdraw deemed admitted admissions. 
If defendants had efficiently and timely responded to appellant's 
requests, the fees would not have been incurred. Thus, appellant 
should not be required by the trial court to shoulder the burden of 
appellees' dereliction. The proper course would have been to 
either disallow withdrawal of the deemed admitted admissions, or 
ensure appellant was not prejudiced by awarding her attorney fees. 
It should be the law that, with respect to 36(b) motions, 
whenever the party who has obtained admissions has reasonably 
incurrred substantial legal fees as a direct result of the opposing 
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party's failure to properly respond to requets for admissions, that 
party will be "prejudiced," as the term is used in Rule 36, unless 
and until the opposing party has reimbursed attorney fees. 
Further, in this case, plaintiff's proffer of evidence of 
additional irreparable damage, and request for a hearing thereon to 
produce witness testimony to support that proffer, met her burden 
of proving additional prejudice. No evidence to the contrary was 
submitted by defendants. The court abused its discretion in 
ignoring the unequivocal fact that plaintiff had incurred 
substantial attorney fees that had not been reimbursed, and in 
failing to take into account plaintiff's diminished ability to 
present evidence supporting her claims of prejudice in granting the 
motion to withdraw. 
POINT III. The trial court abused its discretion by ignoring 
then deemed admitted admissions as to damage amounts when it 
required an evidentiary hearing on damages. 
Plaintiff has completely and adequately addressed this issue 
in her initial Brief. Utah case law clearly holds that admissions 
as to damages are valid, and the trial court abused its discretion 
by requiring that plaintiff prove amounts already admitted to be 
owing. 
Respectfully submitted this 20thxday of May, 1993. :nx«Lay or May, i y y j . ^ 
Brian W. Steffensdn 
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f / A p p e l l a n t 
Bernice Consalvo 
by Alan T. Macdonald 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 20th day of May, 1993 I caused 
two true and correct copies of the foregoing instrument to be 
mailed, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Ronald C. Barker, #0208 
David C. Cundick, #4817 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84115-3692 
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Rule 36 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 36- Request for admission. 
(a) Request for admission. A party may serve upon any other party a 
written request for the admission, for purpose of the pending action only, of 
the truth of any matters within the scope of Rule 26(b) set forth in the request 
that relate to statements or opinions of fact or of the application of law to fact, 
including the genuineness of any documents described in the request. The 
request for admission shall contain a notice advising the party to whom the 
request is made that, pursuant to Rule 36, the matters shall be deemed admit-
ted unless said request is responded to within 30 days after service of the 
request or within such shorter or longer time as the court may allow. Copies of 
documents shall be served with the request unless they have been or are 
otherwise furnished or made available for inspection and copying. The request 
may, without leave of court, be served upon the plaintiff after commencement 
of the action and upon any other party with or after service of the summons 
and complaint upon that party. 
Each matter of which an admission is requested shall be separately set 
forth. The matter is admitted unless, within thirty days after service of the 
request, or within such shorter or longer time as the court may allow, the 
party to whom the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the 
admission a written answer or objection addressed to the matter, signed by 
the party or by his attorney, but, unless the court shortens the time, a defen-
dant shall not be required to serve answers or objections before the expiration 
of 45 days after service of the summons and complaint upon him. If objection 
is made, the reasons therefor shall be stated. The answer shall specifically 
deny the matter or set forth in detail the reasons why the answering party 
cannot truthfully admit or deny the matter. A denial shall fairly meet the 
substance of the requested admission, and when good faith requires that a 
party qualify his answer or deny only a part of the matter of which an admis-
sion is requested, he shall specify so much of it as is true and qualify or deny 
the remainder. An answering party may not give lack of information or 
knowledge as a reason for failure to admit or deny unless he states that he has 
made reasonable inquiry and that the information known or readily obtain-
able by him is insufficient to enable him to admit or deny. A party who 
considers that a matter of which an admission has been requested presents a 
genuine issue for trial may not, on that ground alone, object to the request; he 
may, subject to the provisions of Rule 37(c), deny the matter or set forth 
reasons why he cannot admit or deny it. 
The party who has requested the admissions may move to determine the 
sufficiency of the answers or objections. Unless the court determines that an 
objection is justified, it shall order that an answer be served. If the court 
determines that an answer does not comply with the requirements of this rule, 
it may order either that the matter is admitted or that an amended answer be 
served. The court may, in lieu of these orders, determine that final disposition 
)f the request be made at a pretrial conference or at a designated time prior to 
rial. The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses incurred 
n relation to the motion. 
(b) Effect of admission. Any matter admitted under this rule is conclu-
tvely established unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or amend-
ment of the admission. Subject to the provisions of Rule 16 governing amend-
ent of a pretrial order, the court may permit withdrawal or amendment 
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when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby 
and the party who obtained the admission fails to satisfy the court that with-
drawal or amendment will prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense 
on the merits. Any admission made by a party under this rule is for the 
purpose of the pending action only and is not an admission by him for any 
other purpose nor may it be used against him in any other proceeding. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Advisory* Committee Note. — The 1986 
amendment to this rule varies from the present 
rule and the federal rule in that it requires the 
request for admission to advise the party on 
whom the request is made of the consequences 
of failure to respond, i.e., that the matter will 
be deemed admitted for the purposes of the 
pending action. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule corresponds 
to Rule 36, F.R.C.P. 
Cross* References. — Procedure for service, 
Rule 4-502, Rules of Judicial Administration. 
Service of summons and complaint, Rule 4. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Effect of admissions. 
—Affidavit contradicting admissions. 
—Introducing admissions into evidence. 
—Offer of proof contrary to admission. 
—Relief from judgment. 
Matter of law. 
Privilege against self-incrimination. 
Procedure. 
—Failure to file response with court. 
—Failure to respond. 
Objectionable matter. 
Prison inmate. 
—Motion to dismiss. 
Toiling. 
—Punitive damages. 
Cited. 
Effect of admissions. 
—Affidavit contradicting admissions. 
Where defendant failed to respond to plain-
tiff's request for admission and made no mo-
tion to withdraw or amend the admissions but 
merely submitted an affidavit seeking to con-
tradict the requested admissions, the requested 
admissions were deemed admitted under Sub-
division (a) and conclusively established under 
Subdivision (b). W.W. & W.B. Gardner, Inc. v. 
Park W. Village, Inc., 568 P.2d 734 (Utah 
1977). 
—Introducing admissions into evidence. 
Although matters admitted pursuant to this 
rule are deemed conclusively established, that 
(act does not relieve the party who wishes to 
rely on those admissions from the necessity of 
introducing them into evidence; plaintiffs fail-
ure to introduce admissions into evidence fore-
dobed him from relying on them in the re-
quested instructions to the jury. Massey v. 
Haupt, 632 P.2d 824 (Utah 1981). 
—Offer of proof contrary to admission. 
Where in response to a request for admis-
sions under this rule, the defendants stated 
that they were drilling for oil afler the joint 
operating agreement was executed, it pre-
cluded proof that the drilling was done by a 
corporation over which the defendants had con-
trol. Mud Control Labs. v. Covey, 2 Utah 2d 85, 
269 P.2d 854 (1954). 
—Relief from judgment. 
Rule 60(b), providing relief from judgment or 
orders under certain circumstances, does not 
provide that as part of the order setting aside a 
judgment any admissions are also set aside: 
those matters are covered exclusively by a mo-
tion made as provided by Subdivision (b) of this 
rule. Whi taker v. Nikols, 699 P.2d 685 (Utah 
1985). 
Matter of law. 
Request for admission of pure matter of law 
is improper, although a request for an admis-
sion of an ultimate fact or application of law to 
fact is proper. Jensen v. Pioneer Dodge Ctr.t 
Inc., 702 P.2d 98 (Utah 1985). 
Privilege against self-incrimination. 
Privilege against self-incrimination may be 
asserted in civil discovery' proceedings, includ-
ing requests for admission; however, to sustain 
an assertion of the privilege, a party must 
show that the responses sought to be compelled 
might be incriminating. First Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass'n v. Schamanek, 684 P.2d 1257 (Utah 
1984). 
Procedure. 
—Failure to file response with court. 
Where defendant failed to file with trial 
court its response to plaintiff's request for ad-
missions, it was within the province of the trial 
court either to deem the matters as being ad-
mitted, or, in the absence of a challenge to 
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